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I. INTRODUCTION
Every first year law student will learn—and eventually become all
too comfortable with—the common axiom “hard cases make bad law.”
While these hard cases may produce worthy academic discussion, they
also create challenging legal hurdles for future courts, future litigants,
and sometimes, citizens who have no intention of ever stepping
through the courthouse doors.  Occasionally, a court may allude to the
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notion that its decision is “bad law,” either through its own admission
or through a complete lack of precedential support for a given out-
come.1  In these situations, the court ultimately faces a crucial deci-
sion: should the court limit its holding in the narrowest sense possible,
or should the court instead show its work and attempt to rationalize
the volatile or suspect result?
Every word in an opinion is important.2  In a legal universe where
stare decisis is nearly sacrosanct, every word written by a court may
be potentially relied on for decades.3  Thus, it would seem to follow
that hard cases—and the corresponding “bad law”—should, whenever
possible, address only the most narrow issues to dispose of a case.
This approach, known as judicial minimalism, has been most strongly
advocated by distinguished law scholar Cass Sunstein as an approach
to limit the largely non-democratic role of the judicial branch.4  Mini-
malist courts act with the mindset of, “Today I’ll tell you a little.  If
you bring me your next dispute tomorrow, I’ll tell you a little more.
But you must keep coming back to me to get the answers.”5  However,
some hard cases demand a court show its work and give state actors
and citizens reliable guidance.  Some cases require that a court
soundly theorize its holding and pronounce a clear rule for future
application.
In April 2014, the Iowa Supreme Court heard and decided Chiodo
v. Section 43.24 Panel,6 which presented the question of whether oper-
ating while intoxicated (OWI), second offense, was an “infamous
crime” within the meaning of Iowa’s voter disqualification constitu-
tional provision.7  Article II, section 5 of the Iowa Constitution pro-
1. See, e.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 319 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“I sus-
pect that this case is a prime example of the adage that ‘bad facts make bad
law.’”); see also N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 364 (1904) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (writing that great cases, like hard cases, make “what previously was
clear seem doubtful, and before which even well settled principles of law will
bend”).
2. See Adam N. Steinman, To Say What the Law Is: Rules, Results, and the Dangers
of Inferential Stare Decisis, 99 VA. L. REV. 1737, 1792–1807 (2013) (emphasizing
the importance of a court’s explicitly articulated rules to determine the binding
nature of a decision).
3. See Frank B. Cross & James F. Spriggs II, The Most Important (and Best) Su-
preme Court Opinions and Justices, 60 EMORY L.J. 407, 429–43 (2010) (quanti-
fying the “importance” of a Supreme Court decision, in part, based on the number
of citations in subsequent decisions).
4. See Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108
HARV. L. REV. 1733, 1753 (1995) (noting that judicial invocation of large theories
against the democratic process should be a “rare event”).
5. Ronald F. Wright, When Do We Want Incomplete Agreements?  A Comment on
Sunstein’s Holmes Devise Lecture, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 459, 465 (1996).
6. 846 N.W.2d 845 (Iowa 2014).
7. Id. at 847.
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vides that a person “convicted of any infamous crime”8 is not entitled
to vote in statewide elections or run for statewide office.9  All things
considered, Chiodo was a hard case.10  Accordingly, Chiodo will likely
be seen as bad law: a three-justice plurality overruled a nearly 100-
year-old decision, cast serious doubt on an equally tenured doctrine,
and offered a new framework to define infamous crime with no more
explanation than necessary.11  Meanwhile, a two-justice special con-
currence disagreed that the court’s precedent must be overruled, but
nevertheless departed from that precedent and applied its own rea-
soning.12  Further, one dissenting justice disapproved of the analysis
by both the plurality and concurrence, and instead concluded the
court’s century-old doctrine should have bound the court in the cur-
rent case.13  Post-Chiodo, the interpretation of “infamous crime,”
which affects every Iowan’s right to vote,14 is undeniably more ambig-
uous than ever before.15
This Note explores whether a court must avoid judicial minimal-
ism in certain cases and instead develop a broad theoretical founda-
tion for its holding.  Part II first presents the facts of Chiodo, provides
the reasoning of the court’s three opinions, and outlines the basic ten-
ets of Sunstein’s judicial minimalism doctrine.16  Section III.A identi-
fies two distinct levels of judicial minimalism that appear in the
Chiodo decision.17  Section III.B advances four indicators for future
courts to consider in determining whether judicial minimalism is an
8. IOWA CONST. art. II, § 5.
9. Article II, section 5 of the Iowa Constitution only disqualifies persons convicted of
an infamous crime from voting.  However, state law requires that any person
seeking elective office must also be an eligible elector. IOWA CODE § 39.26 (2013).
See infra text accompanying notes 46–48.
10. As noted by Justice Mansfield in his specially concurring opinion, the Iowa Legis-
lature’s definition of OWI, second offense, as an “aggravated misdemeanor”
blurred the once-clear line between simple misdemeanors and felonies. Chiodo,
846 N.W.2d at 861 (Mansfield, J., specially concurring).  Iowa law now trifurcates
misdemeanors as either simple, serious, or aggravated.  Punishment for these
crimes ranges from a $65 fine to two years imprisonment. See IOWA CODE § 903.1
(2014).
11. See Chiodo, 846 N.W.2d at 848–57 (plurality opinion).
12. See id. at 857–63 (Mansfield, J., specially concurring).
13. See id. at 863–65 (Wiggins, J., dissenting).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 46–48.
15. A policy discussion of whether voter disqualification provisions are constitutional
is beyond the scope of this Note. See, e.g., Lauren Handelsman, Note, Giving the
Barking Dog a Bite: Challenging Felon Disenfranchisement Under the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1875 (2005); see generally Richardson v.
Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S.
Constitution does not prevent states from disqualifying certain voters).
16. See infra Part II.
17. See infra section III.A (identifying that the entire court reached an incompletely
theorized agreement, while the plurality in particular arrived at an incompletely
specified agreement).
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efficient or beneficial use of the court’s resources in disposing of the
case.18
Subsection III.B.1 proposes courts should avoid minimalism when
interpreting constitutional rights.19  Subsection III.B.2 suggests
courts should employ minimalism only to the extent that the doctrine
of stare decisis applies.20  Subsection III.B.3 posits courts should
avoid minimalism when a decision involves repeat state actors or in-
stitutions.21  Finally, subsection III.B.4 proposes courts should not
employ minimalism if there is substantial risk of increased future liti-
gation.22  Because all four indicators were present in Chiodo, the case
operates as a constructive example of the consequences that may re-
sult if a court nevertheless adopts a minimalist approach.23  Ulti-
mately, this Note concludes that certain cases, based on these
indicators, should not be disposed of using minimalism because of in-
evitable adverse consequences.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Chiodo v. Section 43.24 Panel Facts
On March 11, 2014, Anthony Bisignano filed an affidavit of candi-
dacy to run for the Iowa Senate.24  Bisignano had previously been con-
victed of OWI, second offense, and was sentenced to seven days in jail
and two years of probation.25  After Bisignano filed for office, another
candidate, Ned Chiodo, filed an objection to Bisignano’s entrance into
the senate race on the grounds that Bisignano was disqualified from
holding public office under article II, section 5 of the Iowa Constitu-
tion.26  Under section 5, “A person adjudged mentally incompetent to
vote or a person convicted of any infamous crime shall not be entitled
18. See infra section III.B; infra note 23.  While these indicators are only intended to
apply to a jurisdiction’s highest court, lower courts may also consider the de-
scribed indicators before reaching a disposition.
19. See infra subsection III.B.1 (arguing that because the judiciary is the final arbiter
of a constitution’s text, an incompletely specified agreement can only negatively
affect the individual rights provided for therein).
20. See infra subsection III.B.2 (arguing that a rejection of stare decisis should gener-
ally lead a court to supplant that precedent with a comparable substitute).
21. See infra subsection III.B.3 (arguing that a minimalist approach in cases involv-
ing governmental actors increases the probability of future inconsistent adminis-
trative application).
22. See infra subsection III.B.4 (arguing that a court should avoid a minimalist dis-
position if its holding will create future litigation for itself or lower courts).
23. The four indicators in section III.B are not necessarily conjunctive or disjunctive.
Instead, a court may determine that a minimalist approach is inappropriate or
inefficient if one indicator is particularly strong or if several indicators appear in
one case.
24. Chiodo v. Section 43.24 Panel, 846 N.W.2d 845, 847 (Iowa 2014).
25. Id.
26. Id.
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to the privilege of an elector.”27  Because Iowa law requires any person
seeking elective office to be an “eligible elector” at the time of the elec-
tion,28 Chiodo believed that Bisignano should be barred from running.
Pursuant to Iowa law, Chiodo’s objection was heard by a panel
comprised of the Iowa Attorney General, the Iowa Auditor of State,
and the Iowa Secretary of State (the Panel).29  The Panel denied Chi-
odo’s objection, finding that OWI, second offense, was not an infamous
crime within the meaning of section 5, and therefore Bisignano was
eligible to run for state senate.30  Chiodo appealed to the district
court, which affirmed the Panel’s decision.31  Almost immediately, the
Iowa Supreme Court granted expedited review.32  A mere fifteen days
separated the district court’s affirmance of the Panel’s findings, sub-
mission of appellate briefs, oral argument, and issuance of the Su-
preme Court’s final opinion.33
B. Chiodo v. Section 43.24 Panel Opinions
The issue presented to the Iowa Supreme Court in Chiodo was
quite clear: whether OWI, second offense, is an infamous crime within
the meaning of article II, section 5 of the Iowa Constitution.34  The
27. IOWA CONST. art. II, § 5.  In 2008, Iowa voters amended article II, section 5 of the
Iowa Constitution to “update descriptions of mentally incompetent persons we no
longer use.” Chiodo, 846 N.W.2d at 854 n.3.  Because the 2008 amendment did
not implicate the provision’s infamous crime language, the plurality did not con-
sider the amendment in its analysis. Id.  However, Justice Mansfield considered
the amendment relevant insofar as it substantiated the Iowa Legislature’s defini-
tion of “infamous crime” at the time the amendment was passed by the legisla-
ture and by voters. See id. at 861–63 (Mansfield, J., specially concurring).
28. See IOWA CODE § 39.26 (2013).
29. Chiodo, 846 N.W.2d at 847 (plurality opinion); see IOWA CODE § 43.24(3)(a)
(2013).
30. Chiodo, 846 N.W.2d at 847 (plurality opinion).
31. Id.
32. See id. at 847–48; see also IOWA R. APP. P. 6.1101(2)(d) (providing that the su-
preme court shall ordinarily retain cases “presenting fundamental and urgent
issues of broad public importance requiring prompt or ultimate determination by
the supreme court”).
33. It is quite possible the court’s review was substantially affected by the limited
timeframe.  The district court affirmed the Panel’s decision on April 2. Chiodo,
846 N.W.2d at 847.  Ned Chiodo and the State of Iowa, as legal representative of
the Panel, filed briefs with the Iowa Supreme Court on April 4 and April 7, re-
spectively.  Brief for Appellant, Chiodo, 846 N.W.2d 845 (No. 14-0553), 2014 WL
2991821; Respondent/Appellee’s Final Brief, Chiodo, 846 N.W.2d 845 (No. 14-
0553), 2014 WL 2991822.  Oral argument was held on April 9 before the court.
Oral Argument, Chiodo, 846 N.W.2d 845 (No. 14-0553), archived at http://perma
.unl.edu/JU9J-Z5LK.  Ultimately, the court’s opinion was issued on April 15, as
corrected on April 16.  See Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV.
633, 656–59 (1995), for a general discussion of the importance of time in order for
a decision-maker to reach a well-reasoned conclusion.
34. Chiodo, 846 N.W.2d at 848.
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Iowa Supreme Court is not the first state high court to interpret the
phrase “infamous crime” for purposes of a voter disqualification con-
stitutional provision;35 in fact, seven other state constitutions provide
for voter disqualification after conviction of a crime deemed “infa-
mous.”36  While some courts cited precedent to interpret the phrase,37
others simply deferred to a legislative definition.38  Still others en-
gaged in an independent textual analysis of the phrase.39  Remarka-
bly, Chiodo drew on all three interpretive approaches before reaching
a conclusion.40
Unfortunately, the outcome of Chiodo was less than clear: a three-
justice plurality found the crime is not infamous because it is not a
“particularly serious” crime that tends to undermine the electoral pro-
cess.41  A two-justice concurrence agreed the crime is not infamous,
but only because the crime is not a felony.42  The lone dissenting jus-
tice argued the crime is categorically infamous because it carries a
punishment of confinement in prison.43  Ultimately, because five of
the six participating justices44 agreed that Bisignano’s crime—an ag-
gravated misdemeanor—was not infamous, he was eligible to run for
the Iowa Senate.45
Chief Justice Mark Cady, who authored the court’s plurality opin-
ion, first recognized the gravity and significance of the case by imme-
35. See, e.g., Snyder v. King, 958 N.E.2d 764 (Ind. 2011).
36. See ALA. CONST. § 182; IND. CONST. art. II, § 8; MD. CONST. art. I, § 4; N.M.
CONST. art. VII, § 1; N.Y. CONST. art. II, § 3; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 5; WASH.
CONST. art. VI, § 3; see also KY. CONST. § 145 (disqualifying persons convicted of a
“high misdemeanor”); S.C. CONST. art. II, § 7 (disqualifying persons convicted of a
“serious crime”); TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1(b) (disqualifying persons convicted of
“other high crimes”).
37. See, e.g., Md. Green Party v. Md. Bd. of Elections, 832 A.2d 214, 223 (Md. 2003)
(citing State v. Bixler, 62 Md. 354 (1884) for the proposition that a citizen is dis-
qualified from voting if the crime was “infamous” at common law).
38. See, e.g., Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009, 1012 n.1 (9th Cir. 2003) (sup-
plementing the Washington Constitution’s infamous crime disqualification provi-
sion with a statutory definition).
39. See, e.g., People v. Fabian, 85 N.E. 672 (N.Y. 1908); Snyder, 958 N.E.2d at
773–77.
40. See infra text accompanying notes 50–68.
41. Chiodo v. Section 43.24 Panel, 846 N.W.2d 845, 856 (Iowa 2014) (plurality
opinion).
42. Id. at 857 (Mansfield, J., specially concurring).
43. Id. at 863–64 (Wiggins, J., dissenting).
44. Justice Brent Appel took no part in the decision.  Given the court’s splintered
holding, Justice Appel’s participation in any future case implicating article II,
section 5 could very likely “do some mind changing.”  Ryan Koopmans, Iowa Su-
preme Court Splits Over What Kinds of Criminals Can Vote, ON BRIEF: IOWA’S
APPELLATE BLOG (Apr. 16, 2014, 11:12 AM), http://www.iowaappeals.com/iowa-
supreme-court-rules-that-aggravated-misdemeanors-arent-infamous/, archived
at http://perma.unl.edu/7NF7-MTEE.
45. Chiodo, 846 N.W.2d at 857 (plurality opinion).
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diately refocusing the issue from whether conviction of an infamous
crime precluded a candidate from running for office to whether convic-
tion of an infamous crime precludes a citizen from voting in an elec-
tion.46  “An ‘eligible elector’ under our law is a person who possesses
the qualifications to be a registered voter. . . . Thus, restrictions on
those who run for office are actually restrictions on those who can
vote.”47  Uncontroverted by the concurrence or the dissent, the entire
court clearly recognized that Chiodo’s holding would impact every
Iowan’s fundamental right to vote in future democratic statewide
elections.48
The plurality next recognized it did not begin its “resolution of this
case on a clean slate.”49  Namely, the plurality was referring to a tril-
ogy of cases—dating back to 1916—which defined infamous crime as
any crime punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary.50  The
plurality acknowledged that the court’s precedent had given the
phrase “a rather direct and straightforward definition[;]”51 however,
the plurality determined the phrase “infamous crime” was intended to
disqualify voters based on conviction of any particular crime, not the
resulting punishment for the crime.52  “The drafters of our constitu-
tion easily could have chosen to disqualify those convicted of crimes
‘punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary;’ . . . [b]ut, our draft-
ers did not.”53  Thus, the plurality overruled one case of its trilogy and
formally disapproved of the remaining two.54
46. Id. at 848 (plurality opinion).
47. Id.
48. Id.; see generally Devine v. Wonderlich, 268 N.W.2d 620, 623 (Iowa 1978) (observ-
ing that the right to vote is a fundamental political right).
49. Chiodo, 846 N.W.2d at 849 (plurality opinion).
50. See State ex rel. Dean v. Haubrich, 83 N.W.2d 451 (Iowa 1957); Blodgett v.
Clarke, 159 N.W. 243 (Iowa 1916) (per curiam); Flannagan v. Jepson, 158 N.W.
641 (Iowa 1916).
51. Chiodo, 846 N.W.2d at 849 (plurality opinion).
52. Id. at 851.
53. Id. at 852 (citing OREGON CONST. art. II, § 3 (providing that the privileges of an
elector are forfeited “upon conviction of any crime which is punishable by impris-
onment in the penitentiary”)).
54. Id.  Only Blodgett v. Clarke rested exclusively on an interpretation that “infa-
mous crime” should be defined by the punishment of a crime, not the nature of
the crime itself.  159 N.W. at 244 (“As the punishment . . . for forgery is confine-
ment in the penitentiary not more than ten years, the offense is infamous.”).  Ac-
cordingly, the plurality found Blodgett to be clearly erroneous and overruled it.
Chiodo, 846 N.W.2d at 852 (plurality opinion).  However, Haubrich and Flanna-
gan primarily addressed other matters of law. See Haubrich, 83 N.W.2d at
459–60 (holding that a presidential pardon is not necessary for the reinstatement
of a person’s right to hold state office after conviction of a federal crime); Flanna-
gan, 158 N.W. at 644 (holding that a person sentenced to the penitentiary must
be afforded procedural due process rights).  The plurality formally disapproved of
“any suggestion” in Haubrich or Flannagan that infamous crime means a crime
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After alluding to its precedent, the plurality confronted a definition
the Iowa Legislature gave to the phrase “infamous crime” in 1994.55
For purposes of administering statewide elections, infamous crime
means “a felony as defined [in Iowa law] or an offense classified as a
felony under federal law.”56  The legislature’s definition classified “in-
famous crime” in terms of conviction, not punishment, which was con-
sistent with the plurality’s earlier conclusion.  However, the plurality
nevertheless determined that “felony” and “infamous crime” must
have different meanings since the framers did not simply use the word
“felony” to disqualify voters.57  Notably, the plurality observed that
“[w]hile the legislature may help provide meaning to the constitution
by defining undefined words and phrases, the definition provided by
our legislature itself must be constitutional. . . . In the end, it is for the
courts to interpret the constitution.”58  Thus, the court proceeded to
analyze the phrase independently.
The plurality then reached a conclusion contrary to both its own
precedent and the legislature’s statutory definition.  Because the voter
disqualification provision was placed in article II of the Iowa Constitu-
tion, titled “Right of Suffrage,”59 the plurality determined the provi-
sion was intended to serve a regulatory, not punitive, function.60
Accordingly, a felony for purposes of the Iowa criminal code was dis-
tinct from an infamous crime for purposes of voter disqualification.61
Together, these findings led the plurality to conclude that infamous
crimes, for purposes of voter disqualification, are only those that tend
to indicate the voter may “compromise the integrity . . . of democratic
governance through the ballot box.”62
To define which crimes should be deemed “infamous,” the plurality
cited cases from other states interpreting the phrase.  Crimes present-
ing “a reasonable probability that a person . . . poses a threat to the
punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary. Chiodo, 846 N.W.2d at 852
(plurality opinion).
55. Chiodo, 846 N.W.2d at 852 (plurality opinion).
56. IOWA CODE § 39.3(8) (2013).
57. Chiodo, 846 N.W.2d at 853–54 (plurality opinion) (“[I]f our founders intended the
infamous crimes clause to mean all felony crimes, we must presume they would
have used the word ‘felony’ instead of the phrase ‘infamous crime.’” (citing Sny-
der v. King, 958 N.E.2d 764, 771 (Ind. 2011))).
58. Id. at 852–53; see infra subsection III.B.1 (arguing that because the judiciary is
the final arbiter of the constitution’s text, an incompletely specified agreement
can only negatively affect the individual rights provided for therein).
59. IOWA CONST. art. II.
60. Chiodo, 846 N.W.2d at 855 (plurality opinion) (“Within this context and setting,
the concept of disenfranchisement was not meant to punish certain criminal of-
fenders or persons adjudged incompetent, but to protect ‘the purity of the ballot
box.’” (quoting Washington v. State, 75 Ala. 582, 585 (1884))).
61. Id. at 853 (“Our framers knew the meaning of felony and knew how to use the
term.”).
62. Id. at 856.
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integrity of elections,”63 offenses that “involve the charge of false-
hood,”64 or offenses constituting “great moral turpitude”65 had all
been considered infamous by other state courts.  Ultimately, the plu-
rality unveiled its original two-pronged analytical framework to deter-
mine whether a citizen commits a crime so infamous as to be
disqualified from voting in a statewide election.  First, the crime must
be classified as “particularly serious.”66  Second, the crime must re-
veal that voters who have committed the crime “tend to undermine
the process of democratic governance through elections.”67
Because all misdemeanor crimes are categorically not particularly
serious for purposes of this framework, the plurality concluded
Bisignano’s crime of OWI, second offense—an aggravated misde-
meanor—was not infamous.68  Chief Justice Cady then abruptly en-
ded the plurality’s analysis by stating:
It will be prudent for us to develop a more precise test that distinguishes
between felony crimes and infamous crimes within the regulatory purposes of
article II, section 5 when the facts of the case provide us with the ability and
perspective to better understand the needed contours of the test.  This case
does not. . . .
. . . .
Our decision today is limited.  It does not render the legislative definition
of “infamous crime” under Iowa Code section 39.3(8) unconstitutional.  We
only hold OWI, second offense, is not an “infamous crime” under article II,
section 5, and leave it for future cases to decide which felonies might fall
within the meaning of “infamous crime[s]” that disqualify Iowans from
voting.69
The plurality’s opinion was met with strong criticism from both
concurring and dissenting justices.  Justice Edward Mansfield, who
authored the special concurrence, agreed with the plurality that OWI,
second offense, was not an infamous crime; however, Justice Mans-
field would have instead adopted a bright-line felony–misdemeanor
rule to determine whether a crime is infamous.70  The justice prima-
rily objected to the plurality’s unclear reasoning and lack of foresight,
instead categorizing the plurality’s mode of interpretation as “an odd
63. Snyder v. King, 958 N.E.2d 764, 782 (Ind. 2011).
64. Commonwealth ex rel. Baldwin v. Richard, 751 A.2d 647, 652 (Pa. 2000).
65. Washington, 75 Ala. at 585.
66. Chiodo, 846 N.W.2d at 856 (plurality opinion).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 857–58.
69. Id. at 857.
70. Id. (Mansfield, J., specially concurring).  Notably, Justice Mansfield did not sup-
port the plurality’s opinion insofar as it overruled Blodgett v. Clarke and formally
disapproved of Flannagan v. Jepson and State ex rel. Dean v. Haubrich because
“when those cases were decided, ‘felony’ and ‘crime punishable by imprisonment
in the penitentiary’ were synonymous.” Id. at 861.  Because a majority of the
justices did not overrule Blodgett, it continues to bind Iowa lower courts. See
infra note 96 and accompanying text.
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mix of half-hearted originalism and excessive fealty to a court decision
from Indiana.”71  But Justice Mansfield also voiced serious concern for
the future of ballot and voting rights cases given the new, relatively
indeterminate framework offered by the plurality.72
Justice David Wiggins, who authored the dissent, was similarly
concerned with the uncertain future of Iowa voting rights.  Justice
Wiggins would have affirmed the court’s precedent and continued to
define “infamous crime” as any crime carrying a punishment of incar-
ceration instead of the plurality’s “rewriting nearly one hundred years
of caselaw.”73  The justice was not primarily concerned with future lit-
igation, but instead focused on the effect Chiodo may have on individ-
ual voters.74  Under the plurality’s new framework, which Justice
Wiggins described as “dangerous and uncharted waters,”75 otherwise
qualified voters may be discouraged from voting for fear of being pros-
ecuted for voter fraud.76
C. Judicial Minimalism
Many courts—some more frequently than others—have written
something to the effect of: “The issue before this court is X.  We as-
sume, without concluding, that X is permissible.  However, we need
not address X to dispose of the case currently before us.”77  This ap-
proach largely reflects an interpretive philosophy called judicial
minimalism, which provides that a court should avoid broad rules or
abstract theories, say no more than is necessary to justify an outcome,
and leave as much as possible undecided.78
Distinguished legal scholar Cass Sunstein is one of the most signif-
icant advocates of judicial minimalism and has written extensively on
the advantages and disadvantages of its use.79  The doctrine is
71. Chiodo, 846 N.W.2d at 858 (Mansfield, J., specially concurring).
72. Id. (“When we overrule precedent that established a definite rule, we owe the
public more than a welcome mat for future lawsuits.”); see infra subsection III.B.4
(arguing that a court should avoid a minimalist disposition if its holding will cre-
ate future litigation for itself or lower courts).
73. See Chiodo, 846 N.W.2d at 863 (Wiggins, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 864.
75. Id. at 865.
76. See id. at 864–65.
77. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (“It is important to note,
however, that we express no opinion concerning the sufficiency of respondent’s
complaint against the defendants who are not before us.  Respondent’s ac-
count . . . alleges . . . misconduct that we need not address here.  Our decision is
limited to the determination that respondent’s complaint does not entitle him to
relief from petitioners.”).
78. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SU-
PREME COURT 3–4, 9 (1999).
79. See, e.g., id.; Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Minimalism, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1899
(2006); Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L.
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founded on the belief that the judicial branch—the least democratic of
all three branches—should avoid deciding complex issues that could
otherwise be resolved by elected legislative or executive representa-
tives.80  By doing so, the judiciary more effectively maximizes democ-
racy and free deliberation.81  Judicial minimalism is also founded on
the idea that every decision inevitably includes both decision costs and
error costs.82  Thus, if a court avoids well-theorized doctrines and
broad generalizations, it can decrease the burden of its decision and
reduce any future misinterpretation of an ambiguous or vague
holding.83
Judicial minimalism can generally take one of two forms in a
court’s decision: an incompletely theorized agreement or an incom-
pletely specified agreement.84  First, Sunstein describes an incom-
pletely theorized agreement as one in which a court reaches the
disposition of a case but does not actually agree on the high-level prin-
ciples or justifications that ultimately support that disposition.85  To
some extent, incompletely theorized agreements are an inherent by-
product of multimember courts and may result from several concur-
ring opinions.86  Second, judicial minimalism may take the form of an
incompletely specified agreement if the agreement is unified on a high
level of abstraction, but the court declines to articulate how its holding
must be applied in future cases.87  This approach allows judges to
reach an exact conclusion in the present case without establishing a
REV. 4 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, General Propositions and Concrete Cases (with
Special Reference to Affirmative Action and Free Speech), 31 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 369 (1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, General Propositions]; Sunstein, supra
note 4.
80. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 78, at 3–4.
81. See id.; see also Christopher J. Peters, Assessing the New Judicial Minimalism,
100 COLUM. L. REV. 1454 (2000) (distinguishing procedural minimalism from sub-
stantive minimalism in determining whether judicial minimalism furthers ac-
countability and democracy).  But cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67
U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 330–37 (2000) (discussing whether certain canons of con-
struction are a catalyst or a barrier for democracy).
82. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 78, at 46–50.  Decision costs usually take one of two
forms: a court may be faced with the burdensome task of creating a rule that
covers all imaginable situations, or it may create a broad rule that is later de-
clared irrelevant because of changed circumstances. Id. at 46–48.  Alternatively,
error costs include future mistaken judgments rendered by courts misinter-
preting a court’s overbroad rule. Id. at 49.  In this context, error cost can mani-
fest itself in a “large number of small mistakes or a small number of large
mistakes.” Id.  Sunstein writes that minimalism is “the best way” to reduce both
decision and error costs. Id. at 50.
83. See id. at 46–50.
84. Wright, supra note 5, at 459–60.
85. Id. at 459.
86. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 78, at 47.
87. Wright, supra note 5, at 459–60.
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concrete general rule that may later lead to absurd or ridiculous
results.88
Judicial minimalism is not a hard-and-fast rule.  Several commen-
tators have criticized its use and noted the substantial adverse effects
judicial minimalism may have on various aspects of the legal sys-
tem.89  Instead, these scholars have encouraged “judicial maximalism”
in some cases, which occurs when judges set broad rules for future
application and provide thorough or ambitious theoretical underpin-
ning for a decision.90  Sunstein himself does concede that a minimalist
approach may harm future courts and future litigants when those par-
ties need to know the rule of law in advance to plan for the future.91
However, according to Sunstein, these situations are uncommon and
judicial minimalism largely represents the most democratic and effi-
cient approach for a court to decide the issues it is presented.92
III. ANALYSIS
A. Dual Disorder: Two Levels of Minimalism
Justice Mansfield remarked in his specially concurring opinion
that “the plurality has done a good job of saying what the legal stan-
dard for disqualification isn’t . . . . [But] the plurality offers no further
guidance as to what the standard is.”93  This statement presumably
echoes the reaction of any legal scholar asked to explain Chiodo’s hold-
ing and the state of the law moving forward.  The plurality avoided
any broad, theoretical underpinning to its new two-pronged analysis,
it declined to apply the framework to any other crime except OWI,
second offense, and it refused to elaborate which elements of a crime
88. Id. at 460–61; see also Sunstein, General Propositions, supra note 79, at 371–72
(advocating for incompletely specified agreements because “general principles do
not decide concrete cases” (citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905)
(Holmes, J., dissenting))).
89. See, e.g., Yavar Bathaee, Comment, Incompletely Theorized Agreements: An Un-
workable Theory of Judicial Modesty, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1457 (2007) (arguing
that minimalism is less viable when the Supreme Court adjudicates constitu-
tional issues); Lawrence Friedman, Reactive and Incompletely Theorized State
Constitutional Decision-Making, 77 MISS. L.J. 265, 294–303 (2007) (arguing that
minimalism negatively affects state constitutional decision-making); Wright,
supra note 5, at 464–66 (arguing that minimalism is unsound when a court must
define the relationship between governmental actors).
90. SUNSTEIN, supra note 78, at 9–10.
91. See id. at 48, 54–57; see also Sunstein, supra note 4, at 1767 (“I am thus declining
to endorse . . . a claim that incompletely theorized agreements are always the
appropriate approach to law and that more ambitious theory is always illegiti-
mate in law.”).
92. See Sunstein, supra note 4, at 1767 (preferring an approach where “[j]udges . . .
adopt a presumption rather than a taboo against high-level theorization”).
93. Chiodo v. Section 43.24 Panel, 846 N.W.2d 845, 860 (Iowa 2014) (Mansfield, J.,
specially concurring).
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would “tend to undermine the process of democratic governance.”94
The plurality opinion plainly employed a minimalist approach in de-
ciding Chiodo.  But more generally, the entire court took part in a sec-
ond, larger level of minimalist thinking—an approach that leaves the
state of the law equally unclear.
The court as a whole (including the plurality, concurrence, and dis-
sent) all took part in an incompletely theorized agreement.95  In other
words, the court could not agree on a high-level principle that led it to
conclude that OWI, second offense, is not an infamous crime for pur-
poses of the voter disqualification provision.  Mathematically, five of
the six participating justices concluded the crime was not infamous.
However, the disposition is incompletely theorized because the agree-
ment is supported by two alternative theories: first, because OWI, sec-
ond offense, is not a crime that tends to undermine the electoral
process (the plurality’s view); and second, because it is not defined as a
felony by law (the special concurrence’s view).
The court’s incompletely theorized agreement will impact future
Iowa voting rights cases simply because no opinion received a majority
of the justices’ endorsement.  The plurality’s overruling of Blodgett
and formal disapproval of Flannagan and Haubrich certainly sends a
powerful message; however, the cases remain “good” law because a
majority of the justices did not agree that the cases should be over-
ruled.96  Thus, if the Iowa Supreme Court were to interpret article II,
section 5 again in the near future, three still-viable arguments could
be made after Chiodo.  “Infamous crime” could either mean a crime
that tends to undermine the democratic process, a crime that is classi-
fied as a felony as defined by the legislature, or a crime carrying a
punishment of incarceration.  Put simply, disposition of a future case
implicating Iowans’ fundamental political right to vote depends on one
justice from Chiodo changing his vote.97
But second, and more troubling, the plurality engaged in an incom-
pletely specified agreement when it vaguely concluded that “infamous
crime” means a particularly serious felony that evinces a voter’s ten-
dency to undermine the electoral process.98  The plurality’s reasoning
is incompletely specified because although it determined OWI, second
94. Id. at 856 (plurality opinion).
95. See sources cited supra notes 84–86 for a general discussion of incompletely theo-
rized agreements.
96. See Audubon-Exira Ready Mix, Inc. v. Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R. Co., 335 N.W.2d 148,
151 (Iowa 1983) (holding that a prior plurality decision is not binding as prece-
dent); cf. State Inst. for Feeble Minded v. Stillman, 20 N.W.2d 417, 420 (Iowa
1945) (noting that while plurality opinions are not binding, they are “very persua-
sive” nonetheless).
97. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
98. See sources cited supra notes 87 and 88 for a general discussion of incompletely
specified agreements.
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offense, was not particularly serious enough to be an infamous crime,
it refused to articulate the contours of its nascent framework and give
lower courts or citizens guidance for future cases.  Instead, the plural-
ity determined it would further articulate its framework for voter dis-
qualification at a later date.99
The plurality’s incompletely specified agreement is far more detri-
mental than the court’s general incompletely theorized agreement be-
cause, even though it is non-binding, the plurality’s reasoning will
strongly influence future courts in determining the condition of
Iowans’ voting rights.100  While the plurality confidently rejected
court precedent and legislative authority, it failed to replace existing
law with any guidance or substantive direction.101  Thus, lower courts
interpreting Iowa’s voter disqualification provision will be faced with
two questions.  First, as a threshold matter, these courts must deter-
mine whether the plurality’s new framework applies at all, given its
non-binding status.  Second, these courts must then determine how
the framework applies for any crime other than OWI, second offense.
B. More Harm than Good: Four Indicators
Judicial minimalism—incompletely specified agreements in partic-
ular—may promote democracy and judicial efficiency in certain
cases.102  However, in other cases, a minimalist approach will ad-
versely affect individual rights and foster chronic inefficiency.  The
presence of four indicators outlined below may encourage a court to
avoid a minimalist approach and instead completely theorize its hold-
ing.  These indicators are not conjunctive or disjunctive; instead, a
court may wish to avoid a minimalist approach if one indicator is par-
ticularly strong or if several indicators appear in any given case.  All
four indicators are present in Chiodo, and for that reason, the case
operates as a valuable illustration of the consequences that may result
if a court nevertheless adopts a minimalist approach.
1. Final Arbiter of Constitutional Rights
Courts should avoid a minimalist approach in deciding cases of
constitutional interpretation because of the judiciary’s inherent role
99. Chiodo, 846 N.W.2d at 857.
100. See, e.g., State v. Iowa Dist. Court for Webster Cnty., 801 N.W.2d 513, 519–23
(Iowa 2011) (evaluating two United States Supreme Court plurality opinions
thoroughly before eventually applying the opinions’ reasoning).
101. The plurality also expressly declined to declare the Iowa Legislature’s definition
of “infamous crime” unconstitutional. Chiodo, 846 N.W.2d at 857.  This decision
alone may lead to confusion in administering Iowa’s voting laws. See discussion
infra subsection III.B.3.
102. See sources cited supra notes 79–83.
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within the democratic three-branch system.103  The doctrine of judi-
cial minimalism is largely premised on the belief that elected offi-
cials—not appointed judges—should define the rights and privileges
of citizens.104  “For reasons of both policy and principle,” Sunstein
writes, “the development of large-scale theories of the right and the
good is most fundamentally a democratic task, not a judicial one.”105
However, in cases involving constitutional interpretation, it is well es-
tablished that a legislative definition or administrative opinion does
not constitute binding authority over a jurisdiction’s highest court.106
Because the judiciary’s primary role in a three-branch system is to act
as final arbiter of constitutional text, it makes little sense to yield the
duty of interpreting the framers’ intent to democratically elected offi-
cials.107  Thus, in cases where a court is interpreting constitutional
provisions, the court cannot under-theorize its holding because a fail-
ure to do so may actually negatively affect the exercise of that consti-
tutional right.
In Chiodo, the plurality correctly observed that the Iowa Supreme
Court ultimately has the last word in interpreting the Iowa Constitu-
tion.108  “This important principle has, more than any other, helped
allow our democracy to advance with each passing generation with
our constitutional beliefs intact.”109  However, it appears the plural-
103. A majority of the academic interest in judicial minimalism focuses on the federal
judicial system. See, e.g., Neil S. Siegel, A Theory in Search of a Court, and Itself:
Judicial Minimalism at the Supreme Court Bar, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1951 (2005).
Although this Note only discusses judicial minimalism as it relates to state
courts, the concept of judicial review does not substantially differ between the
federal and state systems. See Jack L. Landau, Some Thoughts About State Con-
stitutional Interpretation, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 837, 848–50 (2011).
104. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 78, at 210.  Admittedly, all Iowa state court judges,
including supreme court justices, must periodically stand for retention and are
subject to removal by voters. IOWA CONST. amend. 21, § 17.  However, the
probability that a particular judge will actually be removed pursuant to a judi-
cial-retention election is extremely low. See Larry Aspin, Judicial Retention Elec-
tion Trends 1964–2006, 90 JUDICATURE 208 (2007). But see generally F. Andrew
Hanssen, The Effect of Judicial Institutions on Uncertainty and the Rate of Liti-
gation: The Election Versus Appointment of State Judges, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 205
(1999) (finding that elected state high court justices and their appointed peers
affect future litigation differently).
105. Sunstein, supra note 4, at 1763.
106. See, e.g., Junkins v. Branstad, 421 N.W.2d 130, 134–35 (Iowa 1988) (citing
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703–05 (1974)).
107. This duty does not prevent a court from considering legislative findings in reach-
ing a conclusion.  In this context, “Legislative judgments are generally regarded
as the most reliable objective indicators of community standards” and should ac-
count for persuasive authority.  State v. Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862, 873 (Iowa
2009) (citing McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 301–02 (1987)).
108. Chiodo v. Section 43.24 Panel, 846 N.W.2d 845, 853 (Iowa 2014) (plurality
opinion).
109. Id.
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ity’s bold observation was only asserted to negate the legislature’s oth-
erwise clear definition of infamous crime—effectively, the plurality
only used its power to interpret constitutional rights as a shield
against legislative intervention, not as a sword for constructive future
guidance.  Once the plurality defended against the clear fel-
ony–misdemeanor rule proposed by the Iowa Legislature, it failed to
articulate the contours of its own framework.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Wiggins took issue with the plu-
rality’s new interpretation and its impact on an Iowan’s right to
vote.110  Although he agreed with the plurality that the Iowa Legisla-
ture cannot define provisions of the Iowa Constitution,111 Justice Wig-
gins criticized the plurality’s new imprecise standard and maintained
an Iowa citizen convicted of a crime may “ha[ve] no idea as to whether
he or she is eligible to vote.”112  To illustrate this confusion, Justice
Wiggins noted that under Iowa law, a person who steals property val-
ued at $1,000 will be convicted of an aggravated misdemeanor, while a
person who steals property valued at $1,001 will be convicted of a fel-
ony.113  Using the first prong of the plurality’s test, the first convict
would definitely not be disqualified from voting because misdemean-
ors are categorically not particularly serious for purposes of the analy-
sis.114  However, the second convict may be disqualified from voting if
the court were to determine the theft indicated the convict tends to
undermine the political process.115  Accordingly, Justice Wiggins re-
jected the new analysis and concluded that “[t]his uncertainty will
keep many [otherwise] qualified voters from the polls for fear of prose-
cution for voter fraud.”116
Surely, judicial minimalism cannot prevail at the cost of discourag-
ing a citizen from voting.  In many cases, minimalism may promote
democracy through public accountability in the executive and legisla-
tive branches.  However, in cases where the judiciary is called to inter-
pret a constitutional provision affecting an individual right, the court
cannot under-theorize its holding simply because it believes another
case in the future may provide it with the “ability . . . to better under-
stand the needed contours of the test.”117  This is especially true when
a court expressly dismisses legislative authority but fails to replace
that authority with a suitable alternative.
110. Id. at 863–65 (Wiggins, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 864.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 864–65 n.11 (citing IOWA CODE § 714.2(2)–(3) (2014)).
114. Id. at 857 (plurality opinion).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 865 (Wiggins, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 857 (plurality opinion).
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2. Application of Stare Decisis
Courts should only embrace judicial minimalism when also giving
strong effect to the doctrine of stare decisis.118  As a general matter,
only the highest court in a particular jurisdiction is “allowed” to reject
stare decisis and instead reconsider its precedent to reach an alterna-
tive conclusion.119  However, high courts that reject stare decisis must
develop a theorized holding to take that precedent’s place.  Before
overruling precedent, courts often engage in a practice called “justifi-
catory ascent,” a practice where the court thoroughly identifies its pre-
cedent as flawed before reaching its new, more principled holding.120
By its very nature, justificatory ascent often leads a court to theorize
its new holding.121  If a court engages in justificatory ascent but in-
stead concludes with a narrow or incompletely specified holding, the
court creates more confusion than before it began its analysis.
The tandem of justificatory ascent followed by a minimalist dispo-
sition is clearly incompatible.  In Chiodo, the plurality first acknowl-
edged, “We do not begin our resolution of this case on a clean slate.”122
Namely, the plurality was referring to the court’s three doctrinal
cases—referred to as “the trilogy” by all interested parties123—which
dated back nearly one hundred years.  By the court’s own admission,
the trilogy had given infamous crime “a rather direct and straightfor-
ward definition”124: a crime was categorically infamous if it was pun-
ishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary.125  However, as the
plurality proceeded to analyze its precedent rather thoroughly, it be-
118. See generally Bathaee, supra note 89, at 1463–78 (discussing the relationship be-
tween judicial minimalism and the doctrine of stare decisis).
119. High courts may appropriately reject stare decisis, especially when interpreting a
constitutional provision. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,
66 (1996) (noting that because the issue before the Court involved the interpreta-
tion of the U.S. Constitution, “none of the policies underlying stare decisis” re-
quired the Court to adhere to its precedent).
120. See RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 51–53 (2006); Ronald Dworkin, In Praise
of Theory, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 353, 356–57 (1997); see, e.g., W. Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 388–400 (1937) (engaging in a thorough discussion of its
precedent before overruling in part Adkins v. Children’s Hosp. of D.C., 261 U.S.
525 (1923)); see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
860–64 (1992) (discussing the significance of overruling precedent instead of rec-
ognizing stare decisis).
121. Bathaee, supra note 89, at 1474–75.
122. Chiodo, 846 N.W.2d at 849 (plurality opinion).
123. Brief for Appellant, supra note 33, at 23; Respondent/Appellee’s Final Brief,
supra note 33, at 15; Brief of Intervenor Respondent-Appellee, Chiodo, 846
N.W.2d 845 (No. 14-0553), 2014 WL 2991823, at *1.
124. Chiodo, 846 N.W.2d at 849 (plurality opinion).
125. Id. (citing State ex rel. Dean v. Haubrich, 83 N.W.2d 451 (Iowa 1957); Blodgett v.
Clarke, 159 N.W. 243 (Iowa 1916) (per curiam); Flannagan v. Jepson, 158 N.W.
641 (Iowa 1916)).
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came remarkably clear the plurality would eventually depart from its
precedent in favor of a new theoretical framework.
The Iowa Supreme Court first interpreted the phrase “infamous
crime” in 1916 as it relates to due process rights protected by the U.S.
Constitution.126  The court relied in part on the U.S. Supreme Court
decision Ex parte Wilson127 and concluded a crime was infamous, for
purposes of due process rights, if it carried a punishment of incarcera-
tion in the penitentiary.128  Although the Flannagan Court provided a
straightforward definition of “infamous crime,” the interpretation
clearly did not address Iowa’s voter disqualification provision.129  This
alone was enough for the Chiodo plurality to effectively disregard
Flannagan’s interpretation, reasoning the opinion “made no effort” to
define “infamous crime” for purposes of Iowa’s voter disqualification
constitutional provision.130
However, the court unambiguously defined the phrase only months
after deciding Flannagan, this time for purposes of the voter disquali-
fication provision.  In a brief explanation, the court in Blodgett v.
Clarke stated:
To be eligible to an elected office created by the Constitution a person must be
a qualified elector.  Section 5 of article 2 of the Constitution of Iowa declares
“that no . . . person convicted of any infamous crime shall be entitled to the
privilege of an elector.” Any crime punishable by imprisonment in the peniten-
tiary is an infamous crime.  As the punishment prescribed by statute for for-
gery is confinement in the penitentiary not more than ten years, the offense is
infamous.131
The Blodgett Court clearly addressed the phrase “infamous crime”
within the context of the voter disqualification statute; however, the
Chiodo plurality suggested that because “we provided no other analy-
sis in explaining our decision,” Blodgett was not necessarily disposi-
tive of the issue presented.132  The plurality similarly distinguished
State ex rel. Dean v. Haubrich, the third of the trilogy, which held that
the phrase meant any crime punishable by imprisonment in the peni-
tentiary for purposes of article II, section 5 of the Iowa Constitu-
tion.133  The plurality concluded these decisions were inadequate
126. Flannagan, 158 N.W. at 643.
127. 114 U.S. 417 (1885).
128. Flannagan, 158 N.W. at 644.
129. The issue presented to the court in Flannagan arose when the defendant was
sentenced to one year in the state penitentiary for violating a court-ordered in-
junction. Id. at 641–42.
130. Chiodo, 846 N.W.2d at 850 (plurality opinion).
131. Blodgett v. Clarke, 159 N.W. 243, 244 (Iowa 1916) (per curiam) (emphasis added)
(citing Flannagan, 158 N.W. 641).
132. Chiodo, 846 N.W.2d at 851 (plurality opinion).
133. State ex rel. Dean v. Haubrich, 83 N.W.2d 451, 452 (Iowa 1957) (citing Blodgett,
159 N.W. 243; Flannagan, 158 N.W. 641).
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because the court had not engaged in an independent textual analysis
of the phrase.134
Iowa’s highest court is certainly free to reject the doctrine of stare
decisis when interpreting a provision of the state constitution.  The
Chiodo plurality appropriately engaged in conscientious justificatory
ascent before rejecting its precedent, which generally supplies valua-
ble theoretical underpinnings for the court’s resulting new interpreta-
tion.  However, the plurality ultimately failed to deliver a valuable
and constructive opinion on Iowa voting rights because it abruptly fol-
lowed its justificatory ascent with an incompletely specified agree-
ment.135  After it thoroughly concluded that the case could not be
disposed of using past precedent or legislative interpretation, the
court did not adequately articulate why the disqualification provision
should instead serve a regulatory, administrative purpose.136  Courts
giving less deference to stare decisis should avoid judicial minimalism
and more thoroughly develop the underlying theory of a particular
disposition.
3. Repeat Players and Institutional Relationships
Courts should avoid a minimalist approach when deciding cases
involving “repeat players,” or in other words, state institutions or pub-
lic actors.  Unlike cases between private litigants, cases involving gov-
ernmental actors generally involve issues of public interest.
Accordingly, these issues are more likely to appear in future litigation
and the repeat players “will themselves be back to the court room, if
the court insists on playing some . . . ill-defined role in the contro-
versy.”137  Thus, incompletely theorized agreements involving repeat
134. Chiodo, 846 N.W.2d at 851 (plurality opinion) (“This background reveals that we
have never engaged in a textual analysis of the meaning of ‘infamous crime’ in
article II, section 5. . . . We feel obligated to conduct this analysis before relying
on [our precedent] to resolve this case.”).
135. The plurality did reference early Iowa territorial legislation and early drafts of
the Iowa Constitution after eluding its precedent and the legislature’s statutory
definition. Id. at 854–55.  However, this authority only led the plurality to con-
clude once again that the legislature does not have carte blanche to define “infa-
mous crime.” Id. (comparing the Iowa provision with IND. CONST. art. II, § 8,
which delegates the authority to define infamous crime to the legislative branch).
After concluding that the provision should serve a regulatory, not punitive, pur-
pose, the plurality eventually concluded that a definition “is not easy to articu-
late.” Chiodo, 846 N.W.2d at 856 (plurality opinion).
136. Chiodo, 846 N.W.2d at 856; see supra text accompanying notes 59–62.  The plu-
rality acknowledged that the regulatory purpose “helps frame both the govern-
mental interest at stake . . . and the individual’s vital interest in participating
meaningfully in their government[;]” however, the plurality ultimately postponed
articulating how those interests should interact. Chiodo, 846 N.W.2d at 857.
137. Wright, supra note 5, at 465.  In addition to this re-litigation problem, govern-
mental actors must also make “coordinated, systemwide choices” about issues of
756 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:737
players are essentially a judicial power grab.138  Alternatively, a more
theorized rule provides other state actors with advanced notice and
planning, which in turn yields consistent, jurisdiction-wide
application.139
Chiodo only focused on the meaning of one two-word phrase within
one section of the Iowa Constitution.140  But beneath this constitu-
tional phrase is a legislative, regulatory, and judicial framework that
involves county and state officials, both elected and unelected.  Conse-
quently, a change to the interpretation of one constitutional phrase
inevitably leads to numerous adjustments within this framework.  As
the clarity of the court’s interpretation decreases, the confusion and
inconsistency within this framework necessarily increases.  In this
case, the plurality’s hesitance to fully theorize its new interpretation
will ultimately lead to inconsistent administration of Iowa’s election
laws.  These inconsistencies will manifest themselves in constant liti-
gation involving state actors and confusion regarding the current
state of the law.
The Iowa Code includes the procedure for comprehensive voter re-
gistration,141 the administration of statewide elections,142 and voter
disqualification.143  In addition, state law provides the procedures for
restoration of individual rights.144  Together, these sections of the
Code cover the potential “lifespan” of an Iowa voter: from initial voter
registration, to the exercise of that right via primary and general elec-
tions, potential voter disqualification, and possible restoration of the
right to vote.  In theory, state law should mirror the Iowa Supreme
Court’s interpretation of “infamous crime”—or at least reflect the
meaning of the court’s previous interpretation from 1957.145  To the
public interest, choices which will affect “many private parties simultaneously.”
Id. at 465–66.
138. Id. at 465.  “At least in a field crowded with other legal actors, it is an insistence
that the judge remain the final word, time after time.” Id.
139. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 78, at 55 (“Minimalism might be threatening to the rule
of law insofar as it does not ensure that decisions are announced in ad-
vance. . . . [I]t is more important for people to know what the law is than for the
law to have any particular content.”).  See infra note 157 for an illustration of
how Chiodo may plausibly lead to inconsistent jurisdiction-wide future
application.
140. Chiodo, 846 N.W.2d at 848 (plurality opinion) (“We thus proceed only to consider
Chiodo’s main contention that the Panel’s ruling that OWI, second offense, was
not an infamous crime was contrary to the Iowa Constitution.”).
141. See IOWA CODE ch. 48A (2014).
142. See id. ch. 39 (2014).
143. Id. § 48A.6 (disqualifying a person from voting after having “been convicted of a
felony”).
144. See id. ch. 914 (2014).
145. See State ex rel. Dean v. Haubrich, 83 N.W.2d 451, 452 (Iowa 1957) (establishing
that any crime punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary is an infamous
crime).
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contrary, the Iowa Legislature defined “infamous crime” in 1994 as “a
felony as defined in section 701.7, or an offense classified as a felony
under federal law.”146  This definition stands in stark contrast to the
court’s 1957 definition of the phrase147 and the court’s definition in
Chiodo.148
The Iowa Secretary of State, who is designated as the state com-
missioner of elections,149 is responsible for prescribing uniform elec-
tion practices and procedures and supervising county commissioners
of elections.150  Together with the county commissioners of elections,
the Secretary of State is responsible for facilitating “widespread avail-
ability of voter registration services.”151  Yet within the voter registra-
tion framework, the Iowa Code states:
The following persons are disqualified from registering to vote and from
voting:
1. A person who has been convicted of a felony as defined in section 701.7,
or convicted of an offense classified as a felony under federal law.  If a
person’s rights are later restored by the governor, or by the president of
the United States, the person may register to vote.
2. A person who is incompetent to vote.152
Chapter 914 of the Iowa Code provides the Governor with the power to
restore rights of citizenship to certain individuals convicted of
crimes.153  But within this entire statutory framework, voter registra-
tion and restoration of voting rights are both predicated on the convic-
tion of a felony, not an infamous crime.154
It is certainly problematic that the meaning of “infamous crime”
pre-Chiodo was inconsistent between Iowa’s legislative, executive, and
judicial branches.  But far more troubling was the plurality’s decision
not to discard the Iowa Legislature’s definition of the phrase once that
definition was disapproved of in its opinion.  The plurality stated that
its decision “does not render the legislative definition of ‘infamous
146. IOWA CODE § 39.3(8).  Section 701.7 generally defines a public offense as a felony
“when the statute defining the crime declares it to be a felony.” Id. § 701.7
(2014).
147. An infamous crime, according to the court in Haubrich, is “[a]ny crime punisha-
ble by imprisonment in the penitentiary.” 83 N.W.2d at 452.
148. An infamous crime, according to the Chiodo plurality, must be particularly seri-
ous and must reveal that the voter who committed the crime “would tend to un-
dermine the process of democratic governance through elections.”  Chiodo v.
Section 43.24 Panel, 846 N.W.2d 845, 856 (Iowa 2014) (plurality opinion).
149. IOWA CODE § 47.1(1) (2014).
150. Id.
151. Id. § 48A.1 (2014); see also id. § 48A.3 (2014) (assigning county commissioners of
elections the same responsibility).
152. Id. § 48A.6 (2014).
153. Id. § 914.1 (2014) (providing that the Governor’s authority to restore rights of
citizenship “shall not be impaired”).
154. See infra text accompanying notes 158–59.
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crime’ under Iowa Code section 39.8(8) unconstitutional.”155  By doing
so, the plurality effectively authorized three interpretations of the
phrase to remain viable: its own new interpretation, the interpreta-
tion of its trilogy precedent, and the Iowa Legislature’s interpreta-
tion.156  The decision not to dispel this confusion means the definition
of infamous crime is arguably more inconsistent post-Chiodo than it
was before the court issued its opinion.157
State institutions have had a difficult time interpreting the court’s
holding in Chiodo.  Soon after the Chiodo opinion was released, the
Iowa Governor’s Office noted in a “Frequently Asked Questions” sec-
tion of its Restoration of Citizenship Rights webpage that (1) the im-
pact of Chiodo means all aggravated misdemeanors are not infamous
crimes, and also stated (2) any person convicted of a felony is disquali-
fied from voting.158  Interestingly, both of these statements are only
true depending on the authority from which they derive: the plurality
declared in Chiodo that all misdemeanors are not infamous for the
purpose of voter disqualification, but only Iowa law disqualifies a per-
son from voting if they have been convicted of a felony.159
The plurality’s minimalist approach in Chiodo will affect state ac-
tors in administering Iowa’s election laws.  While the plurality pro-
posed a framework in which not all felonies are infamous, it declined
to strike down a statute defining all felonies as infamous crimes.  The
plurality’s interpretation of “infamous crime” is clearly different from
the bright-line distinction between misdemeanors and felonies; how-
155. Chiodo v. Section 43.24 Panel, 846 N.W.2d 845, 857 (Iowa 2014) (plurality
opinion).
156. See supra text accompanying notes 96, 100, and 155.
157. The plurality’s opinion may very well lead to inconsistent results among Iowa’s
lower courts.  Illustrating an “unlikely but possible” scenario, Iowa practicing at-
torney Ryan Koopmans has correctly identified that while lower courts may reach
contradictory conclusions after Chiodo, those contradictory conclusions may actu-
ally be affirmed as a matter of law upon further immediate review by the Iowa
Supreme Court. See Ryan Koopmans, Chiodo v. Bisignano: What Happens Now?,
ON BRIEF: IOWA’S APPELLATE BLOG (Apr. 16, 2014, 4:19 PM), http://www.iowaap-
peals.com/chiodo-v-bisignano-what-happens-now/, archived at http://perma.unl
.edu/S585-4N2E.  Specifically, Koopmans applied the court’s Chiodo analysis to
OWI, third offense, which is defined as a felony and carries a punishment of in-
carceration. See IOWA CODE § 321J.2(2)(c) (2014).  Assuming Justice Brent Appel
would still be recused, see supra note 44, Justices Mansfield and Waterman
would now join Justice Wiggins in concluding that the crime was infamous.  Be-
cause the vote would now tie 3–3, the lower court would automatically be af-
firmed.  Thus, any contradictory lower court decisions would be upheld as a
matter of law.  Koopmans, supra note 157.
158. RESTORATION OF CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS FAQ, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR OF IOWA
(last updated Apr. 17, 2014) (on file with author).
159. A high court is not bound by legislative definition when interpreting a constitu-
tional provision. See supra notes 106–07 and accompanying text.  However, it is
unclear which definition should apply when the two definitions conflict and are
both declared constitutional by the high court.
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ever, the nuanced approach is effectively irrelevant if state law dic-
tates all felons are statutorily barred from registering to vote.  By
attempting to leave as much as possible unsaid and to avoid establish-
ing a theorized rule, the plurality instead created more hurdles for
individuals attempting to retain or restore their right to vote.
4. Increased Future Litigation
Courts should avoid a minimalist approach if the court anticipates
a particular holding will result in a substantial increase of future liti-
gation.  Judicial minimalism, as effected through a narrow decision,
generally reduces misinterpretation in later application by either the
same court or in its lower courts.160  However, a court should not nar-
row its reasoning or disposition simply because it can.  Even Sunstein
concedes that while “[d]ecision costs may be low for the judge in the
case at hand, . . . a narrow, shallow judgment in case A will lead to
dramatically increased decision costs for judges in cases B through
Z.”161  By developing a broader rule in the case at hand, a court may
reduce this aggregate decision-cost problem and establish a more con-
sistent interpretation for lower courts to apply.  Future litigation is
inevitable in cases involving constitutional interpretation of individ-
ual rights and those involving repeat state actors.162  Thus, in cases
involving several indicators like Chiodo, the plurality should have es-
pecially sought to reduce the aggregate decision-cost problem by in-
stead properly theorizing its holding.
Unfortunately, the plurality in Chiodo did not account for future
litigation costs when it under-theorized its nascent framework—a
move well documented by the concurrence and dissenting opinions.163
Justice Mansfield noted in his specially concurring opinion: “I think
most people would agree that [the plurality’s] unrefined standards ba-
sically offer no guidance at all, therefore leaving the door wide open
for future litigation.”164  Justice Mansfield was primarily concerned
with an increase in litigation from current inmates demanding they be
allowed to vote while incarcerated.165  Given the plurality’s reasoning
and new framework, Justice Mansfield considered those ensuing law-
suits inevitable.166  Echoing Justice Mansfield’s disapproval, Justice
Wiggins wrote in his dissent that the plurality’s imprecise standards
160. See Sunstein, supra note 78, at 49–50.
161. Id. at 55.  See supra note 82 for an explanation of decision and error costs.
162. See discussion supra subsections III.B.1, III.B.3.
163. See Chiodo v. Section 43.24 Panel, 846 N.W.2d 845, 857, 863 (Iowa 2014).
164. Id. at 858 (Mansfield, J., specially concurring).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 860 (“[T]his standard is essentially no standard at all and will lead to more
voting and ballot cases as we sort out the implications of today’s ruling.”).
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will create election day problems and lead to “an inordinate amount”
of provisional ballots being cast.167
Whether or not a person can vote in a statewide election if they are
currently incarcerated largely depends on the state’s voter disqualifi-
cation constitutional provision.  If the state constitution is silent, a
court must determine whether the government has the independent
authority to disqualify those voters.168  While some state constitutions
expressly prohibit current inmates from voting,169 other state high
courts have concluded the authority to disqualify currently incarcer-
ated individuals falls within a state’s police power.170  Iowa’s voter
disqualification provision is silent as it relates to currently incarcer-
ated prisoners;171 however, the court’s long-held doctrine effectively
neutralized the issue: if an infamous crime depended on the crime’s
punishment, incarcerated individuals were de facto disqualified from
voting upon conviction.  The plurality’s new interpretation of the
phrase no longer depends on the punishment associated with a convic-
tion or whether the crime is categorized as a felony.172  Thus, while
the constitution continues to remain silent as to current inmates, situ-
ations may now realistically arise where an inmate has been incarcer-
ated for a crime that is not infamous according to the plurality’s
framework.173
In this respect, the plurality’s omission does appear to be what Jus-
tice Mansfield called “a welcome mat for future lawsuits.”174  The plu-
rality’s minimalist approach could have easily included a declaration
that currently incarcerated inmates are disqualified from voting
under the state’s police power, such as the Indiana Supreme Court’s
holding in Snyder v. King.175  However, the plurality did not take such
measures, and even if it would have, the opinion did not receive a ma-
jority of the justices’ approval.  “Regardless of the merits of Snyder’s
167. Id. at 865 (Wiggins, J., dissenting) (citing IOWA CODE § 49.81 (2014)).
168. See, e.g., Snyder v. King, 958 N.E.2d 764, 784 (Ind. 2011).
169. See, e.g., R.I. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“No person who is incarcerated in a correctional
facility upon a felony conviction shall be permitted to vote until such person is
discharged from the facility.  Upon discharge, such person’s right to vote shall be
restored.”).
170. See, e.g., Snyder, 958 N.E.2d at 785–86.
171. See IOWA CONST. art. II, § 5 (“A person adjudged mentally incompetent to vote or
a person convicted of any infamous crime shall not be entitled to the privilege of
an elector.”).
172. See Chiodo, 846 N.W.2d at 856 (plurality opinion).
173. Id. at 858 (Mansfield, J., specially concurring) (“[U]nder the plurality’s approach,
even a person who is presently serving a lifetime-without-parole-sentence can ar-
gue that he or she should be able to vote from prison because barring him or her
from voting would ‘undermine the process of democratic governance through
elections.’”).
174. Id.
175. 958 N.E.2d at 785–86.
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reasoning,” wrote Justice Mansfield, “the opinion at least has the vir-
tue of clarifying that current inmates will not be able to vote.  The
plurality opinion here leaves that highly important question unan-
swered.”176  Instead, the plurality may have unintentionally invited
future litigation from currently incarcerated inmates.177
The special concurrence and the dissent also agreed that the plu-
rality’s uncertain interpretation could also lead to future litigation of
claims from ex-convicts who have been released from incarceration,
but have still nonetheless been convicted of a high-level aggravated
misdemeanor or felony crime that does not undermine the democratic
process.178  In Snyder, the Indiana Supreme Court held ex-convicts
may regain their right to vote in statewide elections once they are re-
leased, unless the convicted crime was akin to treason, perjury, mali-
cious prosecution, or election fraud.179  In other words, the ex-convict
would only remain disqualified if they were convicted of a crime in-
volving elements of deceit and dishonesty.180
The plurality failed to address whether such a distinction will ap-
ply in Iowa.  Justices Mansfield and Wiggins were appropriately con-
cerned that the plurality’s framework will lead to an increase in future
litigation because of the plurality’s aversion to establish a comprehen-
sive ruling.181  Further, every inmate or ex-convict who challenges
whether they are disqualified from voting once released necessarily
involves the regulatory agency charged with administering Iowa’s
elections.182  Thus, the challenge does not simply involve two private
entities, but also involves governmental actors.  A contested dispute
must then be heard through the judiciary, who will refer to Chiodo in
interpreting whether the crime is infamous and apply a framework
that has not been fully articulated or widely tested.  As the number of
176. Chiodo, 846 N.W.2d at 860 (Mansfield, J., specially concurring).
177. See generally Martine J. Price, Addressing Ex-Felon Disenfranchisement: Legisla-
tion vs. Litigation, 11 J.L. & POL’Y 369, 391–95 (describing various avenues
through which felon disenfranchisement provisions are typically challenged in
state courts).
178. E.g., Chiodo, 846 N.W.2d at 860 (Mansfield, J., specially concurring) (observing
that because the plurality went “only partway on Snyder” regarding ex-convicts,
the opinion “does not pass [a] clarity threshold and instead fosters uncertainty”).
179. Snyder, 958 N.E.2d at 782.
180. Id.
181. See, e.g., Chiodo, 846 N.W.2d at 864–65 (Wiggins, J., dissenting) (“I see no reason
why at this time we should redefine the term ‘infamous crimes.’  Today I fear we
are abandoning a seaworthy vessel to swim into dangerous and uncharted
waters.”).
182. Iowa law provides that the registration of any voter may be challenged by an-
other voter if the “challenged registrant has been convicted of a felony, and the
registrant’s voting rights have not been restored.” IOWA CODE § 48A.14(1)(e)
(2014).  The voter’s challenge must then be accepted and heard by the county
commissioner of elections. See id. § 48A.15 (2014).
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decisions increase, the number of contradictory rulings will inevitably
increase as well.
IV. CONCLUSION
Often times, a court wants to say as little as possible when it
knows it is dealing with a hard case.  Hard cases make bad law.  But
in some cases, a court must give everyone—from law students to con-
victed felons—future guidance on how its decision must be interpreted
and put into operation.  While judicial minimalism can promote effi-
ciency and democracy by deferring change to representative actors,
these particular cases require that a court fully theorize its holding
and establish a clear rule.
In Chiodo v. Section 43.24 Panel,183 the entire Iowa Supreme
Court took part in an incompletely theorized agreement: the court
made unclear whether Iowa’s voter disqualification constitutional pro-
vision depends on the nature of a crime, the category of a crime, or the
punishment for a crime.  But more importantly, the plurality in Chi-
odo authored an incompletely specified agreement.  Whether a crime
is infamous, according to the plurality, depends on the nature of a
crime—but the plurality made unclear how lower courts, state actors,
or individuals should determine when a particular crime undermines
the political process.
The plurality opinion in Chiodo did not receive a majority of votes
from the Iowa Supreme Court—that much is clear.  But, the plural-
ity’s reasoning did receive the most votes from participating justices.
Thus, the opinion ultimately illustrates the most up-to-date, popular
opinion of the court. Chiodo implicated all four indicators articulated
in this Note; however, the plurality failed to theorize its interpretation
of infamous crime and instead embraced judicial minimalism through
an incompletely specified agreement.  Accordingly, the Chiodo deci-
sion may produce several unintended consequences and appropriately
illustrates these indicators in practice.
First, a court interpreting a constitutional provision that impli-
cates an individual right should avoid under-theorization because its
decision may adversely affect exercise of the individual right itself.
Second, a court giving less deference to stare decisis (or completely
rejecting it) must adequately theorize its eventual holding; conversely,
a court applying stare decisis may more appropriately adopt a mini-
malist approach.  Third, a court must more completely theorize its
holding when the case involves repeat governmental actors or impli-
cates state institutional relationships.  A failure to do so will leave a
state’s statutory framework, such as Iowa’s voting administrative pro-
cedures, in complete disarray.  Finally, a court should avoid under-
183. 846 N.W.2d 845.
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theorizing its decision if the court anticipates a substantial increase in
future litigation.  Although the long-term effects of Chiodo v. Section
43.24 Panel have not yet been realized, the presence of these indica-
tors suggests the court may be confronted with another challenge to
Iowa’s voter disqualification constitutional provision sooner rather
than later.184
184. On November 7, 2014, the American Civil Liberties Union filed a lawsuit on be-
half of Kelli Jo Griffin against the Iowa Governor and Secretary of State, seeking
a declaratory judgment to reinstate Ms. Griffin’s voting rights. See Griffin v.
Branstad, ACLU (Nov, 9, 2014), https://www.aclu.org/cases/griffin-v-branstad,
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/BEH4-VUF3.  Griffin was convicted of a non-vi-
olent felony in 2008 and successfully discharged her sentence in 2013.  Relying on
Chiodo’s “nascent test,” Ms. Griffin’s suit asks the court to permit residents who
have been convicted of felonies that “do not meet the constitutional threshold test
for infamous crimes” to become eligible to vote.  Petition for Declaratory Judg-
ment and Supplemental Injunctive and Mandamus Relief at 10, 18, Griffin v.
Branstad, No. EQCE077368, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/MM78-C7EB.
This case will be heard by the Iowa Supreme Court on review from the Polk
County District Court.
